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The Coverage of the Miller Act
Payment Bond
I. Introduction
The Miller Act' was designed to give laborers, subcontractors,
and materialmen engaged in federal construction projects a remedy
similar to that available under state mechanic's lien statutes,' from
which federal property is exempt.4 Specifically, the Act provides
that prime contractors on most federal construction projects5 must
furnish a payment bond6 to guarantee full payment to persons sup-
1. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e (1976), as amended by Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
585, 92 Stat. 2484. The law was originally enacted in 1935.
2. Shortly after passage of the Miller Act, the Supreme Court in Clifford F. MacEvoy
Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944), defined a subcontractor as "one who performs for
and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the
original contract." Id at 109.
3. See Comment, Mechanic's Liens and Surely Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 YALE
L.J. 138 (1958).
4. See United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947), in which the Court
noted,
[Niothing is more clear than that laborers and materialmen do not have enforcible
rights against the United States for their compensation. . . . They can not acquire a
lien on public buildings, and as a substitute for that more customary protection, the
various statutes were passed which require that a surety guarantee their payment. Of
these, the last and the one now in effect is the Miller Act.
Id at 241, cited with approval in, Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 42 (1960).
5. The Miller Act is concerned with federal construction projects in which the prime
contractor has entered into a contract with the United States "exceeding $25,000 in amount,
for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United
States. ... 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a) (1976) as amended by Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
585, 92 Stat. 2484.
As in private construction, the prime contractor of a federal construction project is the
party awarded the construction contract for the entire project. Typically he performs portions
of the job under his own direction and subcontracts the rest to various specialty subcontractors.
The prime contractor's distinctive function is the coordination and direction of the activities of
the various parties contributing to the construction, and he agrees, because of that role, to be
accountable not only for completion of the entire project according to contract specifications
but also to insure that all costs incurred are paid. R. CLOUGH, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING
8-12 (2d ed. 1969).
6. The payment bond is issued by a corporate surety. By the terms of the bond agree-
ment, the surety assumes liability for failure of the prime contractor to pay debts owed to
parties whom the bond is designed to protect. If the prime contractor fails to pay these parties,
the surety must pay the debts outstanding up to the face amount of the bond. R. CLOUGH,
supra note 5, at 114-18.
Under the Miller Act, the payment bond amounts are on a sliding scale: if the prime
contract price is less than $1,000,000, the bond amount must be 50% of the price; if the prime
contract price is between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000, the bond amount must be 40% of the
contract price; and if the prime contract price is above $5,000,000, the amount of the payment
bond is to be $2,500,000. 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(2) (1976).
plying labor or materials.7
Recognizing early the need to define the parameters of protec-
tion afforded by the Miller Act, the Supreme Court interpreted the
language of the Act as limiting the right to sue on the payment bond
to persons in contractual privity with either the prime contractor or a
subcontractor.8 To be protected by the Miller Act, claimants9 not in
contractual privity"° with the prime contractor must establish that
they have dealt with a subcontractor. I  Since protection for many
plaintiffs depends on meeting this burden, the federal courts, which
have exclusive jurisdiction of Miller Act claims,' 2 must delineate
clear standards for determining whether a party is a subcontractor
within the Act.
After more than forty years of litigation, various indicia of sub-
contractor status have emerged. How a court should weigh conflict-
ing evidence in determining whether a party is a subcontractor,
however, remains unclear. This comment suggests a framework
within which the numerous indicia of subcontractor status may be
organized and accorded proper weight. The goal of this proposal is
to enable courts to weigh conflicting evidence in a manner consistent
with the purposes of the Act. In addition, organizing the criteria that
have been found to indicate subcontractor status will assist all parties
in federal construction work in predicting their rights and liabilities
with respect to the Miller Act payment bond.
II. Historical Background of the Miller Act
State mechanics' lien statutes have protected suppliers of labor
and materials in private construction since the eighteenth century.
Under these statutes, unpaid laborers and subcontractors have a
7. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1976).
8. See Clifford F. MacEvoy v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944) (denying bond cover-
age to a supplier of a material supplier of the prime contractor).
The Court in MacEvoy found two sources of support for its limitation of the coverage of
the payment bond. First, the relevant congressional committee reports indicated that the pay-
ment bond was not intended to protect parties more remote from the prime contractor than
second tier subcontractors (sub-subcontractors). H.R. REP. No. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1935); S. REP. No. 1238, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1935). Second, practical considerations
seemed to indicate that Congress could not have intended to impose virtually unlimited liabil-
ity on the prime contractor and his surety. 322 U.S. at I ll.
9. Claimants in Miller Act litigation are often referred to as use-plaintiffs because suit
must be instituted in the name of the United States for use of the person suing. 40 U.S.C.
§ 270b(b) (1976). The use-plaintiff is usually a laborer, subcontractor, or materialman who has
not been compensated for services rendered. Defendants are the prime contractor and his
surety.
10. A claimant in contractual privity with the prime contractor is one who has entered
into a direct contractual relationship with the prime contractor. These claimants are often
referred to as first-tier subcontractors or first-tier suppliers.
II. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 108 (1944). If the plaintiff
has the burden of proving he has dealt with a subcontractor, a main focus of the litigation is
the characterization of a person who is not a party to the suit. See note 9 supra.
12. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b) (1976).
right to seek a judicial sale of the owner's property in order to satisfy
their unpaid claims.13 Because property of the United States is im-
mune from lien, 4 however, unpaid materialmen and subcontractors
on federal construction projects lacked similar protection.' 5
Congress first attempted to eliminate the hardships faced by
these unpaid materialmen and subcontractors in 1894 by passage of
the Heard Act. 6 The protection proved inadequate, however, be-
cause of insurmountable procedural requirements, I7 and after exten-
sive hearings' 8 on deficiencies of this statute,' 9 Congress passed the
Miller Act in 1935 to improve protection for unpaid laborers, sub-
contractors, and materialmen on federal construction projects.2 °
Unlike the Heard Act, the Miller Act requires the prime con-
tractor in federal construction projects to post two surety bonds:2' a
performance bond 22 to protect the United States from defaulting
prime contractors, and a separate payment bond23 to guarantee full
payment to laborers, subcontractors, and materialmen on the pro-
ject. As a result, claimants on the payment bond are not obligated to
yield to a prior claim of the United States.24 In addition, persons
13. See Comment, supra note 3, at 141.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. In government construction projects an increased risk of nonpayment exists for la-
borers, subcontractors, and material suppliers.
As most contracts for public work are awarded on the basis of competitive bidding
and in most instances the contractor uses, and is required to use the lowest responsi-
ble bidder in each of the subtrades, public work is normally carried on at a low profit
margin. Under these circumstances, insolvencies or bankruptcies among contractors
and their subcontractors have not been infrequent.
Burgess, A Commentary on the Miller Act, 42 B.U.L. REV. 282, 282 (1962).
16. Act of Aug. 13, 1894, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (repealed 1935).
This Act required the prime contractor on a federal project to post a single surety bond
that protected the suppliers of labor and materials as well as the United States from default by
the prime contractor.
17. Before filing suit, for example, parties other than the United States had to wait six
months after the final settlement of the prime contract. Id On larger projects, this resulted in
delays of years before claims could be filed. H.R. REP. No. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3
(1935); see Cushman, Contractors' Bonds on Federal Construction Projects, 41 DICK. L. REv. 1,
3 (1936).
18. See Bonds of Contractors on Public Works.- Hearings on HP, 2068 Before the House
Comm on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-85 (1935).
19. For a detailed analysis of the inadequacies of the Heard Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1263,
supra note 9, at 1-3. See generally Byrne & Costello, The Evolution of Coverage Under the
MillerAct, 28 FORD1Am L. REv. 287, 288-90 (1959); Stickells, Bonds of Contractors on Federal
Public Works, 36 B.U.L. REv. 499, 501-07 (1956).
20. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e (1976), as amended by Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
585, 92 Stat. 2484.
21. 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a) (1976).
22. A performance bond is designed to protect the owner of a structure. In this instance,
the owner is the United States. The surety issuing the bond guarantees that the structure will
be built in substantial accordance with the terms of the contract. R. CLOUGH, supra note 5, at
115.
23. A payment bond is designed to protect third parties who are not parties to the con-
struction contract and guarantees payment for labor or materials used or supplied in the per-
formance of the prime contract. Id at 117.
24. Under the Heard Act, if the United States sued on the single surety bond, the claims
of the government had to be fully satisfied before others could proceed on the bond. In many
filing suit need not await completion of the entire project, but may
institute suit ninety days after their last labor was performed or ma-
terial supplied.25
III. Coverage of the Miller Act Payment Bond
A. Parties Dealing Directly with the Prime Contractor
The beginning of section 270b(a) of the Miller Act extends cov-
erage to "every person who has furnished labor or material" on a
federal construction project. 26 Any laborer, materialman, or subcon-
tractor who contracts with or is employed by the prime contractor is
entitled to sue on the payment bond. Employees of the prime con-
tractor entitled to sue include not only ordinary laborers but also
foremen and supervisory personnel. 27 Moreover, coverage of the
payment bond is not limited strictly to parties who have furnished
labor or materials for the construction project. An assignee may also
bring suit on the bond if his assignor had a valid Miller Act claim
against the prime contractor or his surety.
28
Whether a labor union may sue on the payment bond depends
on the nature of the claim asserted. A labor union has no right to
sue on the bond to recover unpaid wages of its members, absent as-
signment by the individual employees of their rights under the Act.29
The rationale is that the Miller Act was primarily designed to insure
payment for services rendered, and a collective bargaining agree-
ment is not a contract for services, but merely governs the general
rules of conduct between employer and employee. Nevertheless, in-
dividual employees who have performed services for the prime con-
tractor retain the right to sue on the payment bond.3°
cases, the amount of the bond was exhausted by the government, and subcontractors and ma-
terialmen, therefore, had no remedy. H.R. REP. No. 1263, supra note 9, at 2.
25. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1976).
26. Id
27. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 37 F. Supp. 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (granting recovery of unpaid wages to co-foremen of the prime contractor).
An architect, however, whose services are limited to drawing plans and specifications for
the project is not a person furnishing labor or material within the statute. J.J. Henry Co. v.
United States, 441 F.2d 1246 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Furthermore, because the Miller Act was designed
solely to protect laborers, subcontractors, and materialmen, a joint venturer with the prime
contractor is not entitled to sue on the payment bond. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. United
States, 238 F.2d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 1956) (dicta). A mere agreement to divide profits with the
prime contractor does not, however, preclude one from being characterized as a subcontractor.
Id at 921.
28. Nickell v. United States, 355 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1966); see Wallick & Stafford, The
Miller Act: Enforcement of the Payment Bond, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 514, 524-25 (1964).
The assignee, of course, acquires no rights against the surety other than those held by the
assignor. Id
A party who lends money to the prime contractor but supplies neither labor nor material,
however, is not entitled to bring suit under the Miller Act even though the money is used to
finance the payroll. Id. at 525.
29. United States v. Woerfel Corp., 545 F.2d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 1976).
30. Id at 1151.
Trustees of union funds may also assert claims under the Miller
Act pursuant to the United States v. Carter decision.3' In Carter,
employees of the prime contractor were hired under a collective bar-
gaining agreement that obligated the contractor to pay specified
wages plus a certain sum per hour of labor to trustees of a health and
welfare fund. The Supreme Court allowed recovery of the funds to
the trustees even though the payment obligation was not stated in the
construction contract with the United States, but appeared only in
the collective bargaining agreement. 32 The Court treated the em-
ployee-executed trust agreement as equivalent to an assignment by
the individual employees of their rights to sue under the Miller
Act.
33
B. Parties Dealing with a Subcontractor
In addition to protecting parties dealing with the prime contrac-
tor, the payment bond protects persons supplying labor or materials
to a subcontractor on federal projects. Upon giving timely notice to
the prime contractor, "any person having direct contractual relation-
ship with a subcontractor but no contractual relationship express or
implied with the [prime] contractor" has a right of action upon the
payment bond.34
In the landmark case of Clford F MacEvoy Co. v. United
States,35 the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Miller
Act, despite its broad language, was not intended to protect literally
every supplier of labor or materials on the construction project. The
Court concluded that the provision granting a right of action to par-
ties dealing with a subcontractor placed a restriction on the coverage
of the payment bond. Coverage was, therefore, limited to material-
men, laborers, and subcontractors dealing directly with the prime
contractor and materialmen, laborers, and subcontractors lacking ex-
press or implied contractual relationship with the prime contractor,
but having a direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor.36
In its decision, the Court further established that a prospective
claimant not in contractual privity with the prime contractor has the
burden of proving that the party with whom he has dealt is a subcon-
tractor as opposed to a materialman.37
31. 353 U.S. 210 (1957).
32. Id at 218.
33. Id at 219-20.
34. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1976).
35. 322 U.S. 102 (1944).
36. Id at 107-08. Since Congress had specifically granted the right to sue on the pay-
ment bond to parties who had dealt with the prime contractor or a subcontractor, the Court
refused to presume that coverage was intended for any other parties. Id. The MacEvoy Court
held, accordingly, that a "second tier supplier," a supplier of materials to a materialman of the
prime contractor, is not covered by the payment bond. Id at I11.
37. Id at 109-11. Besides proving contractual relationship with a subcontractor, claim-
1. Reasons for Distinguishing Subcontractors and Aaterial-
men.-Both legislative intent and practical considerations underlie
the distinction between subcontractors and materialmen in the
claimant's burden of proof. The congressional hearings prior to pas-
sage of the Miller Act consistently differentiated between laborers,
materialmen, and subcontractors.38 Additionally, the relative ease
with which a prime contractor can protect himself against the liabili-
ties incurred by subcontractors as compared with materialmen sup-
ports this distinction. Subcontractors are typically fewer in number
and relatively well known to the prime contractor, who can require
the subcontractors to post a bond guaranteeing payment of their ob-
ligations. The prime contractor cannot similarly protect himself
against the "remote and undeterminable liabilities" of a material-
man, who may be a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer.
39
2. Definitional Attempts to Distinguish Subcontractorsfrom Mfa-
terialmen. -Because the Miller Act does not define subcontractor,
tribunals have been forced to utilize the tools of judicial interpreta-
tion. In MacEvoy, for example, the Court sought guidance by refer-
ence to the technical meaning of the term established by usage in the
building trade. A subcontractor was defined as "one who performs
for and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or
material requirements of the original contract, thus excluding ordi-
nary laborers and materialmen. ' °
This definition was of minimal utility to later courts, however,
because all parties who supply labor or materials may be regarded as
performing a portion of the prime contract.4 ' In attempting to apply
the AacEvoy formulation, lower federal courts reached contradic-
tory results.4 2 In addition, despite emphasis on the established tech-
nical meaning of subcontractor in Ma cEvoy, subsequent lower
federal court decisions have declined to determine whether a party is
a subcontractor primarily by reference to expert opinion concerning
ants not dealing with the prime contractor must also establish that they have provided written
notice of their claim to the prime contractor within ninety days of the date on which the last
labor or material was supplied to the defaulting subcontractor. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1976).
38. See Hearings on HA 2068, supra note 18, passim; Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United
States, 322 U.S. 102, 109 n.7 (1944).
39. 322 U.S. at 110-11 (1944). If every person who supplied labor or material toward a
project were covered by the bond, coverage would extend not only to a manufacturer of steel
girders who sold the girders to the prime contractor but also to a laborer who dug the iron ore,
no matter how many steps removed he was from the prime contractor in the contractual chain.
Burgess, supra note 15, at 284.
40. 322 U.S. at 108-09.
41. See Stickells, supra note 19, at 512-13.
42. Compare Basich Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 159 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1946)
(supplier of sand and gravel to the prime contractor for an airfield held a subcontractor be-
cause the supplier had performed specific parts of the prime contract) with Brown & Root, Inc.
v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 319 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1963) (supplier of sand and gravel held not a
subcontractor but a materialman).
trade customs.
4 3
Subsequent to MacEvoy, courts faced the task of deciding the
status of material suppliers who had been delegated more sophisti-
cated responsibilities than the supply of ordinary building materials.
These responsibilities sometimes included the design and manufac-
ture of complex machinery for incorporation into the project."
While these parties were obviously not "ordinary materialmen,"
whether they were subcontractors for purposes of the Miller Act was
unclear. In deciding these borderline cases, several circuits elabo-
rated on the MacEvoy definition by holding that subcontractor status
requires not only the performance of part of the original contract but
a "substantial relationship" with the prime contractor as well. 45 The
Fifth Circuit elucidated further and found that this relationship ex-
ists when a party has taken responsibility for "a large and definable
part of the construction project."'
Thirty years after MacEvoy, the Supreme Court in FD. Rich,
Inc. v. Uzited States47 reaffirmed the original definition of a subcon-
tractor as one who performs a specific part of the prime contract.
Although reiterating the MacEvoy definition, however, the Court in
Rich followed several circuits and shifted its attention to the sub-
stantiality of a party's relationship with the prime contractor as the
primary consideration in determining whether the party is a subcon-
tractor.4 " The Rich decision failed to disclose, however, how the
substantiality of this relationship should be evaluated. Whether the
inquiry is to focus on the subcontractor's contribution from the view-
point of dollar value, labor investment, physical size, engineering re-
43. See United States v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 175, 181 (D. Md. 1963).
44. See, e.g., United States v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1965) (party supplying
complex hydraulic mechanism for operating doors of a missile launcher); United States v.
Lane Constr. Co., 477 F. Supp. 400 (M.D. Pa. 1979), afl'dmem, No. 79-2282 (3d Cir. Mar. 21,
1980).
45. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1967) (sup-
plier of simple custom fabricated items such as metal stairs, ladders, and trench covers, consti-
tuting two percent of the prime contract price found to lack a sufficiently substantial relation to
the prime contractor to be classified a subcontractor); United States v. Lembke Constr. Co.,
370 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1966) (supplier of concrete according to prime contract specifications
held not substantially related to the prime contractor and therefore not a subcontractor). See
also Traveler's Indem. Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1966); St. Paul-Mer-
cury Indem. Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 1957).
46. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1967).
47. 417 U.S. 116 (1974).
48. F.D. Rich, Inc. contracted with the federal government to build a housing project.
Two contracts were executed by Rich with the alleged subcontractor Cerpac, one for the
millwork and the other for all plywood on the project. Cerpac purchased the wood from
Industrial Lumber Co., but failed to make payments. Industrial was awarded recovery on the
payment bond. Even though Industrial was technically a supplier of a supplier, Cerpac was
found a subcontractor by virtue of Cerpac's various substantial and important relations with
the prime contractor, Rich, both upon this project and others. Id
quirements, or other considerations remains unclear.49
3. A Suggested Framework for Classifying Parties. -While
courts have not arrived at a definition of subcontractor that provides
a useful guide for distinguishing subcontractors from materialmen,
two factual criteria appear to have consistently influenced the courts
in evaluating the substantiality of a party's relationship with the
prime contractor. They are the contribution or lack of contribution
by a firm of on-site labor or supervisory personnel and the nature of
the item or material supplied.
a. The presence or absence of on-site work. -Despite frequent
reiteration of the "substantial relationship" test, a crucial considera-
tion is the presence or absence of on-site work.5 ° The supplying of
labor or supervisory personnel on the construction site by a firm is
generally conclusive evidence that it is a subcontractor.5 The ab-
sence of on-site work, however, may not be determinative of a
party's status. Parties who have done no on-site work have been
found subcontractors if responsibility was delegated to them to sup-
ply complex, custom built items that are important to the project.
5 2
b. The nature of the item or material supplied as determinative of
the party's status. -Absent the contribution of on-site labor by a
party, substantiality of relationship with the prime contractor de-
pends primarily on the nature of the item or material supplied. 3
The types of items courts have considered fall into roughly three
classes: noncomplex, fungible materials; noncomplex, custom manu-
factured items; and complex, custom built items or systems.
The noncomplex, fungible materials category includes goods
49. See Brief for Defendant at 17, United States v. Lane Constr. Co., 477 F. Supp. 400
(M.D. Pa. 1979), a'dmem., No. 79-2282 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 1980).
50. "In many cases, of course, there may be no question whether the middle party is a
subcontractor or materialman. One who undertakes to do all the plumbing, or heating, or
electrical work would certainly be a subcontractor." Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States,
382 F.2d 615, 617 n.2 (5th Cir. 1967). Accord, United States v. Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F.
Supp. 175, 182 (D. Md. 1963), rev'don other grounds, 336 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1964) (supplier's
provision of on-site supervisory personnel an important consideration in determining subcon-
tractor status). See J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 594 n.8 (1977).
Similarly, absent the provision of on-site labor or supervisory personnel, a supplier is not
a subcontractor unless the item supplied is highly complex and of great importance to the
project. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1967). See note 52
and accompanying text infra.
The courts' persistent emphasis on the provision of on-site labor as evidence of subcon-
tractor status has been criticized because a company furnishing steel building materials often
performs more complex and difficult labor than the subcontractor erecting these materials.
Wallick & Stafford, supra note 28, at 523.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 175, 182 (D. Md. 1963),
rev'don other grounds, 336 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1964).
52. See, e.g., United States v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1965).
53. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 615, 617 n.2, 618 (5th Cir.
1967); United States v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1965).
such as sand, gravel, concrete, or any other ordinary material to be
incorporated into the project. Two years after the MacEvoy decision
distinguished between "ordinary materialmen" and subcontrac-
tors, 54 the Ninth Circuit, in Basich Bros. Construction Co. v. United
States,55 found that a supplier of sand and gravel was a subcontrac-
tor.within the Miller Act. Basich, however, proved to be the sole
case interpreting MacEvoy in this way, and the majority of subse-
quent cases have clearly held that suppliers of sand, gravel, and simi-
lar materials are not subcontractors but materialmen.56
The second category, simple, custom manufactured goods, in-
cludes items as varied as steel trusses,57 electric fixtures,58 and pre-
fabricated stairs.59 Cases addressing suppliers of this category of
items have not reached uniform results. Several circuits have
adopted the liberal rule that custom manufacture of an item is suffi-
cient to render its supplier a subcontractor.' Applying this rule,
tribunals have held that suppliers of doors,6 1 kitchen cabinets,62 and
steel girders63 are subcontractors.
The Fifth Circuit, however, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
United States,64 has held that mere custom manufacturing is insuffi-
cient to establish the relationship of responsibility and importance
that qualifies a supplier as a subcontractor. Although no majority
rule has emerged regarding the characterization of suppliers of sim-
ple, custom manufactured goods, the Aetna position is more consis-
tent with the underlying rationale for the distinction between
subcontractors and material suppliers.65 This reason, elucidated in
MacEvoy, is based on the relative ease in policing the financial re-
sponsibility of a subcontractor as opposed to "an ordinary material-
54. 322 U.S. at I11.
55. 159 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1946).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Lembke Constr. Co., 370 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1966) (sup-
plier of all concrete requirements for project not a subcontractor although the concrete had to
conform to certain specificiations in the prime contract); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Gifford-Hill &
Co., 319 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1963)(supplier of sand and gravel not a subcontractor); United States
v. Wright Contracting Co., 194 F. Supp. 444 (D. Md. 1961) (supplier of precast concrete crib-
bing according to government specifications not a subcontractor). Cf United States v. Smith
Road Constr. Co., 227 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Okla. 1964).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis Constr. Co., 398 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Reliance Ins. Co., 390 F. Supp. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
59. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1967).
60. See, e.g., Cooper Constr. Co. v. Public Hous. Admin., 390 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Pa. 1955). See also Miller
Equip. Co. v. Colonial Steel & Iron Co., 383 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955
(1968).
61. United States v. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
62. Cooper Constr. Co. v. Public Hous. Admin., 390 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1968).
63. Miller Equip. Co. v. Colonial Steel & Iron Co., 383 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
64. 382 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1967).
65. See id at 617.
man, who may be a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer."66
Moreover, the decisions holding that custom manufacturing suffi-
ciently demonstrates subcontractor status have questionable prece-
dential value in the light of the Supreme Court's approval in Rich of
the "substantial relationship" test.6 7
Items of the third category include complex, custom manufac-
tured items not readily available on the open market.68 Production
of these items or systems presents complicated problems of engineer-
ing and design and requires highly specialized manufacturing
processes.69 Typical examples include the hydraulic floodgate sys-
tem for a dam,7" underground conduits for a steam distribution sys-
tem,7' and a hydraulic system to open and close the roof of a missile
launcher.72 Generally, the supplier of a highly technical installation
is considered to possess the requisite substantial relationship to the
prime contractor to be considered a subcontractor,73 especially when
the item supplied forms a large and definable part of the construc-
tion project.74
c. Additional considerations used by courts to distinguish subcon-
tractors and materialmen. -Characterizing suppliers of simple or
complex custom manufactured articles presents a difficult task since
courts must decide whether the supplied item is sufficiently complex
to render the supplier a subcontractor.75 In responding to this di-
lemma, judicial consideration has focused on such other facts as the
cost of the item supplied as a percentage of the total prime contract
price, the degree of conformity to the customary manner of paying
subcontractors on government projects, the degree of responsibility
shifted to the supplier for design of the item supplied, and the func-
tional importance to the entire project of the item supplied.
In distinguishing subcontractors from materialmen, the cost of
an item supplied in relation to the total prime contract price some-
times appears determinative. In cases concerning suppliers of simple
to moderately complex manufactured goods, fifteen percent of the
contract price has been found sufficient to create a substantial rela-
66. 322 U.S. at 110.
67. 417 U.S. 116, 123 (1974). See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
68. See, e.g., United States v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1965).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Lane Constr. Co., 477 F. Supp. 400 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aI'd
mem., No. 79-2282 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 1980).
70. Id
71. United States v. Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1963), rev'don other
grounds, 336 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1964).
72. United States v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1965).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Lane Constr. Co., 477 F. Supp. 400 (M.D. Pa. 1979), a f'd
mem., No. 79-2282 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 1980).
74. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1967);
note 47 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 57-60, 69 and accompanying text supra.
tionship between the prime contractor and the supplier and to justify
a finding that the supplier was a subcontractor.
7 6
Not only the amount but also the method of payment to the
supplier has been considered relevant evidence of subcontractor sta-
tus. Because the customary methods of paying subcontractors and
materialmen differ,77 courts sometimes emphasize the manner in
which a party has been paid by the prime contractor as evidence
either of subcontractor or materialman status.78 Whether the party
is labeled "subcontractor" in the agreement with the prime contrac-
tor, however, is not determinative.79
The degree to which the prime contractor shifts responsibility to
an alleged subcontractor for the supply of substantial items required
by the prime contract is sometimes indicative of subcontractor sta-
tus.8 0 A shifting of responsibility is sufficient to render a party a sub-
contractor if, for example, the prime contractor issues only general
directions for the supply of a complex, major item and leaves the
design and precise engineering calculations to the alleged subcon-
tractor.8'
Even when the article supplied costs only a small fraction of the
prime contract price, the element of shifted responsibility may indi-
cate existence of the subcontract relationship. In the recent case of
76. Compare Miller Equip. Co. v. Colonial Iron & Steel Co., 383 F.2d 669 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968) (supplier of simple, custom made items costing fifteen
percent of prime contract price held to be a subcontractor) with Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
United States, 382 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1967) (supplier of simple, custom made items costing two
percent of prime contract price held not a subcontractor).
77. For government construction contracts, subcontractors are frequently required to
submit certified copies of their payrolls to the government contracting officer. See, e.g., United
States v. Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 175, 180 (D. Md. 1963), rev'don other grounds, 336
F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1964). It is also customary for the government agency to schedule payments
to the prime contractor according to estimates of the amount of work satisfactorily completed,
with ten percent of each payment retained pending completion of the project. Similarly, a
subcontractor is paid by the prime contractor according to a schedule of payments, and the
prime contractor retains a percentage of the subcontract price until the subcontractor's work is
satisfactorily completed. See, e.g., United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 194 F. Supp. 444,
447 (D. Md. 1961). See generaly J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS & SUB-
CONTRACTS 243-46 (1964). The prime contractor cannot protect himself against the material-
man by withholding all or a percentage of the payments until the materials are incorporated
into the project because he must pay the materialman within ninety days of delivery of the
material to the site. 40 U.S.C. 270b(a) (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Wright Contracting
Co., 194 F. Supp. 444, 448 (D. Md. 1961).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 194 F. Supp. 444, 447-48 (D. Md.
1961).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Lembke Constr. Co., 370 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 175, 181 (D. Md. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1964). Cf. Miller Equip. Co. v. Colonial Steel & Iron Co., 383
F.2d 669, 674 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
80. See, e.g., United States v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1965); United States
v. Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 175, 181 (D. Md. 1963), rey'don other grounds, 336 F.2d
636 (4th Cir. 1964).
81. United States v. Monaco & Son, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D. Md. 1963), rev'don
other grounds, 336 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1964).
United States v. Lane Construction Co.,8  the court noted that an ad-
ditional consideration as evidence of subcontractor status was the
importance of an item supplied to the function of the entire struc-
ture. Deciding that a supplier of the floodgate system for a dam had
subcontractor status, the court considered the functional importance
of the gates as evidence of the substantiality and importance of the
supplier's relationship with the prime contractor.83 The functional
importance test has rarely been used by courts and may prove un-
workable, however, because the simplest fungible material may be as
essential to the functioning of a structure as the most complex item
supplied.84 Additionally, resolution of the issue of the functional im-
portance of a component supplied may require judicial entangle-
ment in intricate factual disputes with contradictory expert
testimony on questions of engineering.85
C Parties Dealing with Lower Tier Subcontractors
The MacEvoy decision interpreted the Miller Act as extending
the right to sue on the payment bond to "subcontractors who, lacking
express or implied contractual relationship with the prime contrac-
tor, have direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor
. . -986 By extending the right to sue to subcontractors in contrac-
tual relationship with a subcontractor, the decision did not appear to
draw a strict distinction between first tier subcontractors and second
tier subcontractors, or sub-subcontractors. Subsequent litigation,
however, has consistently held that only parties in contractual privity
with the prime contractor may qualify as subcontractors within the
Miller Act.87 Consequently, recovery on the payment bond has not
been possible for parties dealing only with a second tier subcontrac-
tor.
88
Not until 1978 in J W Bateson Co. v. United States89 did the
82. 447 F. Supp. 400 (M.D. Pa. 1979), af'd mem., No. 79-2282 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 1980).
83. Id at 412. Although the price of the floodgates was only two percent of the prime
contract price, and the supplier's responsibility ended upon delivery of the unassembled floo-
dgate components at the construction site, the supplier's relationship to the prime contractor
was sufficiently substantial because the supplier was delegated the principal role in the engi-
neering and design of the floodgates.
84. For example, the supply of concrete is an integral component of an airfield. Under
the "functional importance" test, the supplier of concrete would be considered a subcontractor
even if he merely delivered the material to the job site and performed no installation.
85. For example, the case of United States v. Lane Constr. Co., 477 F. Supp. 400 (M.D.
Pa. 1979), aqfdmem., No. 79-2282 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 1980), was unsuccessfully appealed by the
defendant prime contractor on the ground that the expert testimony at trial was insufficient to
support a finding that the floodgate assembly was an essential component for the functioning
of the dam.
86. 322 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., J.w. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 592 n.6 (1974).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Blount Bros. Constr. Co., 168 F. Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1958)
(denying recovery to a sub-sub-subcontractor).
89. 434 U.S. 586 (1974).
Supreme Court address the availability of Miller Act coverage to
parties who have dealt only with a lower tier subcontractor. The
Bateson court held that a second tier subcontractor may not be con-
sidered a subcontractor within the Miller Act, even though the sec-
ond tier subcontractor was engaged in a substantial relationship with
the prime contractor.9" Accordingly, the Court denied recovery to
trustees of a union pension fund who had contracted only with a
second tier subcontractor.9 '
This result occurred despite the Court's recognition that the
Miller Act is remedial in purpose and should be liberally con-
strued.92 An opposite conclusion, however, would have contradicted
clear evidence of legislative intent to distinguish between subcon-
tractors and sub-subcontractors. 93 The Bateson decision also recog-
nized that the surety cannot reasonably be expected to guarantee the
financial soundness of remote sub-subcontractors whose existence
was unknown to the surety when it issued the bond and over whom
the prime contractor had no power of selection or control.
94
Although contractual privity with the prime contractor is a pre-
requisite of subcontractor status, if a subcontractor is an agent of the
prime contractor and performs no work but is used only to limit the
prime contractor's liability, the shield will be removed. Conse-
quently, the prime contractor and the purported subcontractor will
be treated as one entity.95 The rationale here is that if the prime
contractor were permitted to create sham subcontractors in this man-
ner, liability would not extend beyond parties who were the actual
subcontractors, and the remedial purpose of the Act could easily be
thwarted.96
If the claimant is a third tier subcontractor and the two inter-
vening subcontractors are corporations owned and controlled by the
same individual, a different rule seems to apply in determining the
extent of the right to sue on the bond. The First97 and Third98 Cir-
cuits, for example, have refused to pierce the corporate veil and have
denied recovery to the third tier claimant on the ground that he was
not misled into believing that the two intervening subcontractors
90. Id at 588, 594.
91. id at 592.
92. Id at 594; see id at 595-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. See note 8 supra.
94. See notes 113-17 and accompanying text infra.
95. See, e.g., Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Newton Lumber & Mfg. Co., 388 F.2d 66 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968); National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.2d 294 (5th
Cir. 1967); Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). See also
United States v. Hartfield Accident & Indem. Co., 376 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1967).
96. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Newton Lumber & Mfg. Co., 388 F.2d 66, 70(10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
97. See United States v. Hartfield Accident & Indem. Co., 376 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1967).
98. See United States v. A & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1979).
were a single business entity. This result is questionable, however,
and the interlocking subcontractors should be treated in a manner
consistent with the case of a prime contractor who seeks to avoid
liability through pseudo-subcontractors. 99
IV. Alternative Means for Protecting All Parties Contributing to
the Federal Construction Project
A. Remedies Available to Parties Unprotected by the Miller Act
Alternative means of satisfying unpaid claims for remote sub-
contractors or material suppliers unprotected by the Miller Act are
scarce. An action for breach of contract is unlikely to be successful
because the party who has defaulted on payments is often insol-
vent,' ° and quantum meruit recovery on the payment bond is re-
stricted to parties protected by the Act.' 0 ' Moreover, no claim in
equity or quasi-contract against a prime contractor with whom the
claimant is not in contractual privity is available. 02
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Harris,"'03 the Ninth
Circuit, wholly apart from the Miller Act, granted recovery against a
prime contractor to a fourth tier supplier who was not paid by an
insolvent intervening subcontractor. The amount awarded was the
reasonable value of equipment rented and was predicated on a the-
ory of unjust enrichment."0 The Harris decision is not encouraging
to most unpaid, remote subcontractors or suppliers, however, be-
cause the prime contractor had paid none of the higher tier subcon-
tractors for work in which they utilized the claimant's equipment.
Therefore, refusal to grant recovery would have permitted the prime
contractor to knowingly and unjustly retain benefits of the use of the
fourth tier supplier's services.' 05 The prime contractor in this case
was neither being forced to pay twice for the same services nor to
incur a remote and unforeseeable liability."°6 In addition, the non-
Miller Act claim was permitted in federal court only because it was
pendant to a separate bona fide Miller Act claim.0 7
99. Even absent fraudulent motives, under the present rule prime contractors are given
an incentive to utilize closely interlocking subcontracting firms because the firms can serve as
insulation against liability toward lower tier subcontractors.
100. Surety bonds were originally required because of the futility of bringing ordinary
contract actions against insolvent prime contractors or subcontractors.
101. See generaly Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 746 (1976) (concerning quantum meruit recov-
ery by subcontractors under the Miller Act).
102. See, e.g., Undersea Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. I.T.T., 429 F.2d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 1970).
103. 360 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1966).
104. Id at 411.
105. Id at 409.
106. Id at 405. The prime contractor had engaged in direct dealings with the fourth tier
supplier and, therefore, must have been aware that the services rendered had gone uncompen-
sated by intervening subcontractors.
107. Id at 411.
Although the remote subcontractor or materialman is without
judicial remedy, he may still have a method of preventing payment
defaults before they can arise. This is occasionally accomplished by
insisting that the party obligated to pay, generally a higher subcon-
tractor or supplier, furnish a bond to guarantee payment. s0 8 The
feasibility of this procedure, however, hinges on the bargaining posi-
tion of the party insisting on the bond. Because that party is often
competing with other bidders for the subcontract, his bargaining
power may often prove illusory. Moreover, the smaller firms, those
more remote from the prime contractor in the contractual chain, may
have difficulty in obtaining bonding.
B. Expanding the Coverage of the Payment Bond
Congress has not amended the coverage provisions of the Miller
Act since the Act became effective in 1935. Courts, moreover, have
resisted judicial expansion of the coverage of the Act despite re-
peated acknowledgement of the remedial purpose of the statute.10
9
The term "subcontractor," for example, has been given a technical
meaning that excludes parties not in contractual privity with the
prime contractor, regardless of a substantial contribution to the pro-
ject. The possibility remains, therefore, that the term could be en-
larged to include any party who significantly contributes to the
project without regard to remoteness from the prime contractor in
the chain of subcontracts or material supply contracts. The coverage
of the bond would thus be increased to protect a much larger portion
of the parties who supply labor or materials and would alleviate
much hardship. " 0
To expand the coverage of the payment bond, however, would
adversely affect all parties engaged in the government construction
industry by greatly restricting the availability of suretyship bonds."'
The Miller Act was designed to balance the need to protect laborers
and materialmen against the surety's need for reasonable measure-
ment of the risks assumed by issuing the payment bond.'1 2 Because
the surety issues its bond upon investigation and evaluation of the
108. Collective bargaining agreements sometimes contain a provision requiring the em-
ployer to post a bond to guarantee various payments. See J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States,
434 U.S. 586, 593 n.7 (1974).
109. The Miller Act "is highly remedial ... [and] entitled to liberal construction ...
But such a salutory policy does not justify ignoring plain words of limitation and imposing
wholesale liability on payment bonds." Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S.
102, 107 (1944); see J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 594 (1978).
110. See J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
11i. Brief of the Surety Association of America and the American Insurance Association
of America as Amicus Curiae at 12-15, J.w. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as S.A.A. Brief].
112. See S.A.A. Brief, supra note I l1, at 3-5; Wallick & Stafford, supra note 28, at 514-15.
prime contractor's financial strength and integrity," 3 the surety rea-
sonably can bear the burden of guaranteeing that the obligations of
both the prime contractor and direct subcontractors are met. The
prime contractor can protect himself and insure smooth progression
of the work by refusing to deal with weak subcontractors or those
with a poor reputation for paying debts." 4 The surety can be confi-
dent that the prime contractor for whom the bond is issued is able
and willing to pay its debts. In addition, the surety can reasonably
assume that the prime contractor will choose only subcontractors of
equal financial integrity." 1
5
Expansion of the coverage of the payment bond would require
the surety to guarantee the soundness of companies the identity of
which is not known at the time the bond is issued. 1 6 As a result of
the surety's increased exposure to risk, the availability of bonding
would be greatly restricted." 7 According to ordinary underwriting
principles, bonds could be issued only to larger contractors of greater
financial strength, and sureties would, therefore, be forced to become
more selective in the issuance of bonds."t 8 In addition, prime con-
tractors would require subcontractors to post bonds for total indem-
nification of the prime contractor in the event a subcontractor or any
lower tier party should fail to meet its obligations. Because only the
larger subcontractors could obtain this high risk bonding, restricted
competition and increased construction costs would result.'
C Clarifying the Coverage of the Payment Bond
Although numerous parties supplying labor or material on a
construction project may remain unprotected by the Miller Act, the
present restrictions placed on the coverage of the payment bond are
consistent with the remedial purpose of the Act.' 20 By limiting cov-
113. Before a surety will issue a bond to a construction contractor, a thorough investiga-
tion of the assets, financial commitments, reputation, and abilities of the contractor is under-
taken. Based on this appraisal, the surety will arrive at a "bonding capacity" figure for an
individual contractor. The bonding capacity represents the maximum value of uncompleted
work for which the surety is willing to issue a guarantee for the performance of the job, or the
payment of resulting costs. R. CLOUGH, supra note 5, at 122-25.
114. S.A.A. Brief, supra note I 11, at 7-8.
115. Id at8.
116. Id at 5.
117. Id at 13. Unlike insurers, the surety cannot compensate for increased risk merely by
raising its premium price. Since each project is unique because of location, size, and contrac-
tual requirements, an actuarial computation of risk for each project is impossible. Surety pre-
miums are thus computed as a fixed percentage of the bonding capacity of a firm. Id at 15;
CLOUGH, supra note 5, at 120-22.
The surety's protection against loss is the promise of the principal, who is the prime con-
tractor, to hold the surety harmless against loss. If the amount of the project is significantly
larger than the contractor's bonding capacity, the surety will not issue a bond since the con-
tractor's promise of indemnity would be meaningless. See id at 123.
118. See S.A.A. Brief, supra note 11, at 13-15.
119. See id at 16-17.
120. See notes 93-94, 109 and accompanying text supra.
erage to parties dealing with the prime contractor or first tier subcon-
tractors, the intended balancing of interests is achieved. 12' The
remedial purpose of the Act is, therefore, best achieved by clarifying
the coverage of the payment bond. An advantage of this approach is
that if all parties were able to ascertain their rights and liabilities,
they could structure their affairs to minimize risk of liability or non-
payment. 122 The prime contractor could protect himself by requir-
ing his subcontractors to furnish proper security. 23  Remote
subcontractors and suppliers unprotected by the Act could minimize
risk of nonpayment by avoiding excessive extensions of credit to
higher tier subcontractors or suppliers.
Identification of subcontractors among suppliers of custom
manufactured articles of varying complexity merits further clarifica-
tion. 2 0 Absent conclusive evidence of subcontractor status, such as
the performance of on-site labor, the court must weigh numerous
facts that tend to indicate whether a party is a subcontractor or a
materialman. 25 Consolidation and enumeration of the various fac-
tual considerations and according them proper weight consistent
with the purposes of the Act is, therefore, necessary.
A primary purpose of the Miller Act is restriction of subcontrac-
tor status to parties with a substantial relationship to the prime con-
tractor.'26 Mere reference to the substantial relationship test,
however, provides no method of weighing the numerous indicia of
subcontractor or materialman status. The cost of an item in relation
to the prime contract price, for example, may indicate an insubstan-
tial relationship between the supplier and the prime contractor.
Conversely, the functional importance of the same item to the entire
project may indicate a substantial relationship between the supplier
and the prime contractor.
27
A rational approach to clarifying the "substantial relationship"
test is to maximize coverage of the bond in a manner that still allows
the prime contractor to protect himself. 28 A prime contractor has
121. See S.A.A. Brief, supra note 111, at 3-5. See also note 110 and accompanying text
./pra.
122. See J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 593 (1978).
123. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 110 (1944).
124. See notes 49 & 75 and accompanying text supra.
125. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
126. F.D. Rich, Inc. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1974).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Lane Constr. Co., 477 F. Supp. 400 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aftd
mem., No. 79-2282 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 1980), in which the item supplied, floodgates for a dam,
constituted only two percent of the prime contract price. The gates, however, were function-
ally important to the dam. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra
128. This approach is implicit in the decision of Clifford F. MacEvoy v. United States, 322
U.S. 102 (1944). In MacEvoy, the Court utilized two basic policy considerations in interpret-
ing the Miller Act: (1) the Act is remedial in purpose and entitled to liberal construction; and
(2) Congress cannot be presumed in the absence of express statutory language to have intended
to impose liability on the payment bond in situations in which it is difficult or impossible for
the prime contractor to protect himself. Id at 107, 110.
perhaps only two means of protecting himself; he can deal only with
parties of sound financial reputation, and he can require his direct
subcontractors to furnish a bond to indemnify him against liability
to the subcontractors' creditors.' 29 If the prime contractor fails to
take either of these precautions, he risks liability for Miller Act
claims.
To preserve the prime contractor's ability to protect himself,
several items of evidence should be accorded particular weight in
determining whether a party is a subcontractor. First, the cost of a
custom built item in relation to the total prime contract price 130 is
especially relevant because the prime contractor may lack the time
or resources to investigate the numerous suppliers of articles or
materials costing only a small fraction of the prime contract price.
131
If the prime contractor cannot reasonably be expected to investigate
these parties, he should not be liable for their defaults.
Second, the functional importance of an item to the structure
being built'32 may have no bearing on whether the prime contractor
can protect himself against the supplier's liabilities. 33 When the
supplied item is highly specialized, however, and suppliers are not
readily available, the functional importance of the article supplied
becomes relevant to the prime contractor's self-protection because he
must be certain that the supplier is reputable in order to complete the
entire project on schedule. 13  Suppliers of highly specialized items
that are vital to the project should be considered "substantially re-
lated" to the prime contractor even though the items cost only a frac-
tion of the total prime contract price.'
35
Last, though rarely considered by courts directly, the bonding
capacity 36 of a firm that has supplied custom built installations
should be a prime consideration in determining whether the firm is a
subcontractor. Any firm that has or could have obtained a surety
bond sufficient to indemnify the prime contractor should be classi-
fied as a subcontractor within the Miller Act. Congress originally
intended that subcontractor status depend upon the substantiality of
129. See S.A.A. Brief, supra note I 1, at 8-16.
130. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1967) (assum-
ing large and definable part of prime contract necessary for subcontractor status).
131. See generally S.A.A. Brief, supra note 111, at 6.
132. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
133. Almost any material supplied is functionally important, regardless of the relationship
between the supplier and the prime contractor. See note 84 supra.
134. If a subcontractor becomes insolvent, the prime contractor must find a substitute sub-
contractor or supply the labor or materials himself. If suppliers of an important component
are not readily available, the project will be delayed and the prime contractor will incur liabil-
ity to the United States. See note 5 supra.
135. Because smooth progression of the project depends on the supply of highly special-
ized items that are vital to the project, requiring the prime contractor to investigate the
financial soundness of these parties is reasonable.
136. See note 117 supra.
a party's relationship with the prime contractor to enable the prime
contractor to protect himself.137 If a supplier is able to post bond
security, the prime contractor can protect himself, and the remedial
purpose of the Act is served by considering the supplier a subcon-
tractor, whether or not the item supplied is highly specialized or
functionally important to the project.
V. Conclusion
Although the Miller Act is remedial in purpose and designed to
protect the suppliers of labor or materials on federal construction
projects, numerous persons supplying labor or materials lack protec-
tion. Claimants who have not dealt with the prime contractor have
the burden of proving that their dealings were with a first tier sub-
contractor as judicially defined during forty years of litigation under
the Miller Act.
Firms supplying on-site work to the prime contractor are gener-
ally considered subcontractors. Firms that provide no on-site labor
but merely deliver ordinary building materials, however, are consid-
ered materialmen. Parties supplying custom manufactured items of
varying complexity are harder to categorize, and courts must weigh
numerous factual considerations in deciding whether these suppliers
have a sufficiently substantial relationship with the prime contractor
to acquire subcontractor status. Clarifying the standards for evaluat-
ing the status of suppliers of custom made articles is necessary to
enable all parties in federal construction to predict their payment
bond rights and liabilities.
Any clarification of standards should not grant subcontractor
status to parties whose financial condition would prevent the prime
contractor from protecting himself against the subcontractor's liabili-
ties. A firm's bonding capacity, therefore, should be a primary con-
sideration in determining subcontractor status. Additionally, the
remedial purpose of the Miller Act requires that any firm capable of
indemnifying the prime contractor, by bond or otherwise, should be
considered a subcontractor.
J. THOMAS MORRIS
137. F.D. Rich, Inc. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116 (1974).

